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Land is one of man's most valuable possessions; it was made to
be occupied and exploited, not to lie in waste. To this end, adverse
possession is a useful tool. The justification for governmental im-
munity to limitations is perhaps still valid. But it is doubtful that
the general public is entitled to the protection of that immunity. And
certainly time should run against all private property rights, regard-
less how acquired. It is inescapable that private interests were al-
lowed to avail themselves of governmental immunity in the principal
case. None of the reasons for conferring immunity on public entities,
or even the public at large, apply to private land owners. The public
interest in dedicated streets should not be used to shield private
interests from prescription. Rights in public land can be acquired
by adverse use against all third persons, including abutting property
owners, without regard to whether rights are acquired against the
public.30 The statute has been misapplied by the Kentucky court, and
an unprecedented limitation has been placed upon the law of ad-
verse possession.
Robert G. Zweigart
BREAL POPuRTY-ADvHESE POSSESSION OF ADJOINING LAND BY A Co-
TENANT IN POSSESSION INuREs TO Tm BENE OF Co-TENANT OUJT
oF PossEssioN-In 1953 plaintiff brought this action to quiet title against
defendant Helton. Defendant asserted title by adverse possession
based on a tacking of the adverse possession of George Calvin, one
of his predecessors in title. Prior to 1897 plaintiff's predecessor in title
held a tract of sixteen hundred acres which adjoined a five-hundred
acre tract held by Vint Calvin. In 1897 Vint Calvin died and his tract
passed to several children, one of whom was George Calvin. George
Calvin and his children occupied the tract until 1938, when the Vint
Calvin heirs deeded the land to trustees. In 1942 the trustees deeded
a sixty-acre tract to Helton. This tract, which had been fenced and
cultivated by the Calvins for forty years, included two and one-half
acres lying within plaintiffs tract and adjoining the Calvin tract.
The Calvin children were tenants-in-common, but only one of them,
George Calvin, was in actual possession. Plaintiff contended that the
adverse possession of George Calvin was personal in nature and did
80 11 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 7, § 30.180; Cf. Tarpey v. Madsen, 178
U. S. 215, 220-1 (1900).
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not inure to the benefit of the other co-tenants out of possession.'
The Boyd Circuit Court ruled for the defendant. Held: Affirmed.
Adverse possession of adjoining land by an occupying co-tenant inures
to the benefit of co-tenants out of possession. Big Run Coal & Clay
Company v. Helton, 323 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1959).
The court used as a basic premise the well-settled principle that
the acquisition of an outstanding adverse claim by one co-tenant
inures to the benefit of the other co-tenants. Without questioning the
applicability of its premise, the court immediately concluded that a
co-tenant in possession who occupies and claims an adjoining tract
as a part of the tract held in co-tenancy will be deemed to do so for
the benefit of co-tenants out of possession. Thus it seems that co-
tenants acquire adverse ownership without being in possession of
either the land owned or the land claimed. Upon the narrow fact
situation presented in this case, this conclusion may be justified,
especially in the absence of precise Kentucky precedent. The court
cited Woodruff v. Roysden,3 a Tennessee case, as specific authority
for the result in this case. In that case, it was held that the adverse
possession of one co-tenant inures to the benefit of co-tenants out of
possession, but the adversely possessing co-tenant was not possessing
adjoining property.4 The property involved was the tract allegedly
held in co-tenancy, and thus the question of interpreting the intent
of a co-tenant in possession who adversely possesses an adjoining
tract was not before the court.
Most of the case law pertaining to adverse possession by tenants-
in-common concerns the actions of co-tenants while adversely posses-
sing against their co-tenants. The dearth of case law upon the pre-
cise point presented in the instant case probably explains the reli-
ance of the Kentucky court on the broad principle without detailed
analysis of its application to the facts. It is submitted, however, that
neither the principal case nor the Woodruff case, which it cited,
conclusively answers possible questions which could easily arise in
attempting to apply the general principle to other fact situations. The
most obvious unanswered question would arise where, by conduct
or statements, the co-tenant in exclusive possession of the land owned
and the land claimed intends to claim adversely not only to the
1 For this contention to be decisive of the case, it must be assumed that plain-
tiff further contended that George Calvin could not adversely possess adjoining
land for his own benefit exclusive of his co-tenants and thus pass complete title
to defendant's predecessor. The opinion and the briefs submitted in the case are
completely silent on this point.
22 Tiffany, Real Property § 463 (3d ed. 1939).
3 Woodruff v. Roysden, 105 Tenn, 491, 58 S.W. 1066 (1900).
4Ibid.
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world but also to the co-tenants out of possession. The holding in the
instant case might lead to the conclusion that adverse possession of
an adjoining tract will inure to the benefit of co-tenants out of pos-
session of the tract held in co-tenancy. This implication surely is not
warranted when consideration is given to the fact that the basic
underlying premise used by the Kentucky court is frequently subject
to qualification in the authorities. 5
In addition to the specific qualifications frequently placed on the
general rule of inurement, it is based on the theory that there is a
community of interest among the co-tenants which necessarily in-
volves mutual trust and duty.6 If these are not present, the rule does
not apply.7 Thus, many courts would probably require the co-tenants
to share the cost incident to establishing adverse possession. This
underlying basis for inurement is clearly established where the
co-tenants purchase adverse claims.8 Kentucky considers the pur-
chasing co-tenants a trustee who holds the claim in trust for the benefit
of the other co-tenants dependent upon their respective contributions
to the cost of acquiring the claims.9 Where a purchased claim is not
adverse to the co-tenancy, inurement does not apply.10
Where the facts show a fiduciary relationship between the co-
tenants which creates a presumption of action for mutual benefit, the
position of the Kentucky court taken in the principal case is con-
sistent with the general principle of law that actions by co-tenants
are to be evaluated on the assumption that they are compatible with
the possession of all the tenants-in-common. However, there are at
least three conceivable situations where such an assumption cannot
be made:
(1), Where the co-tenant in possession clearly manifests his intention
to adversely possess for his exclusive benefit.
(2) Where through exclusive possession for a long period of years
the possessing co-tenant eliminates all evidence of an intention
to possess as a fiduciary.
3) Where the co-tenant in p ossession conveys the adversely-held
tract to a third party and the third party holds against all the
world.
For the reasons given, it is submitted that the intent of the posses-
sor as a necessary factor in applying the doctrine of inurement be-
tween co-tenants was not fully appreciated by the court, and thus
this question will have to be faced in future cases.
Richard W. Spears
5 See, e.g., 2 Tiffiany, op. cit. supra note 2, § 465.
6 ld. § 463.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 See Ford v. Jellico Grocery Co., 194 Ky. 552, 240 S.W. 65 (1922) (dictum).
10 2 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 2, § 465.
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TOnTS-NEGLIGENcE-ASSUMTON OF RISK BY GUEST OF INXPERMNCED
DmR-Plaintiff, a guest passenger, was seriously injured when the
automobile in which he was riding left the road and hit a tree.
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was giving driving instructions
to defendant driver (plaintiff's brother), who held only a beginner's
permit. The accident occurred when the defendant pressed the ac-
celerator "too hard," causing the automobile to spin out of control.
Plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries caused by the
alleged negligence of defendant. The defenses were contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk. The trial court rendered judgment
on a verdict for plaintiff and defendant appealed. Held: Reversed.
Plaintiff, who knew of the inexperience of defendant, assumed the
risk of injury in any accident caused by defendant's inexperience in
the proper handling of the mechanical controls. Richards 1. Richards,
824 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1959).
The result reached by the Kentucky court in this case is prob-
ably not at all shocking to the Kentucky lawyer. Many personal in-
jury actions have been dismissed with the oft-quoted phrase "volenti
non fit injuria." The defense of assumption of risk, while meeting
with disfavor in some jurisdictions,' seems to be firmly entrenched
in Kentucky law. It is the purpose of this comment to examine, in the
light of the Richards case, the application of the doctrine in Ken-
tucky.
Assumption of risk, as well as contributory negligence, is a defense
which developed late in the law of negligence. 2 It is based on the
consent of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an obligation of
care owed to the plaintiff.3 In its earliest applications, assumption of
risk was limited to situations in which the plaintiff expressly assumed
a risk through contract.4 The most common application today is the
implied assumption of a particular risk through the conduct of the
plaintiff.5 In implied assumption of risk, knowledge and consent of
the plaintiff are essential in determining whether he will be barred
by his conduct.6
When the doctrine of assumption of risk is used loosely by the
courts, much confusion may result. Interesting examples may be seen
in certain Kentucky cases which confuse the doctrine with that of
I See Peyla v. Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range R. R., 218 Minn. 196,
15 N.W.2d 518 (1944) where the defense is limited strictly to cases involving
the master and servant relationship; Papakalos v. Shalsa, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d
377 (1941); Snelling v. Harper, 137 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).2 Prosser, Torts § 55, at 303 (2d ed. 1955).
3 Ibid.
4 See Porter v. Cornett, 306 Ky. 25, 206 S.W.2d 83 (1947).




contributory negligence.7 It may be that one who appreciates a danger
and voluntarily encounters it is contributorily negligent, but whether
this is true should be determined by the application of a test of
reasonable care for his own safety.8 It seems inconsistent to discuss
the two doctrines concurrently, since the one is based upon a volun-
tary assent,9 while the other rests on failure to exercise reasonable
care for his own safety.
Nevertheless, the Kentucky court has persisted in associating the
two doctrines when assumption of risk is given as the basis for re-
lieving the defendant of liability. The instances in which the doc-
trines are mentioned together range from the statement that where
an assumed risk amounts to unreasonable conduct under the cir-
cumstances, assumption of risk is equivalent to contributory negli-
gence,'8 to a statement that assumption of risk is "closely akin to,
if not a part of, contributory negligence." 1 However, the most ex-
treme statement may be found in the case of Porter v. Cornett. 2
In that case, the plaintiff having been injured while attempting to
hold defendant's stalled truck to keep it from slipping into a ditch,
the court said: "He, as a matter of fact, assumed the risk of the very
event which took place. By so assuming it, he was contributorily
negligent and he cannot now claim the driver of the truck was solely
responsible."12a While there is language in this opinion which indi-
cates that an assumed risk must be unreasonable in order to con-
stitute contributory negligence, the conclusion which the Kentucky
court expressly reached is that where there is assumption of a risk
as a matter of fact, there is contributory negligence as a matter of law.
It may be said that the distinction between the two doctrines
is unimportant, since the effect of each is to absolve the defendant
of liability. Confusion of the two doctrines, however, can lead to
injustices. Because of the exigencies of a situation, a risk might be
7Porter v. Cornett, 306 Ky. 25, 206 S.W.2d 83 (1947); Gates v. Kuchle,
281 Ky. 13, 19-20, 134 S.W.2d 1002, 1005-06 (1939); Poole v. Lutz & Schmidt,
273 Ky. 586, 117 S.W.2d 575 (1938).
8 Restatement, Torts § 463, comment (b) (1934).
9 Restatement, Torts § 893, comment (b) (1939). The term "assent as used
in defining assumption of risk relates to a state of mind of the plaintiff and need
not be communicated to the defendant, as in the defense of "consent."
1 Poole v. Lutz, 273 Ky. 586, 117 S.W.2d 575 (1938). This case involved
an employee of a construction company who was struck by a piece of brick
knocked out of a wall by an independent contractor. The court held that plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent and assumed the risk.
11 Gates v. Kuchle, 281 Ky. 13, 134 S.W.2d 1002 (1939). Plaintiffs had
stopped at defendants gasoline pumps to purchase gasoline and were struck from
the rear by a reckless driver. The court held that the plaintiff assumed the risk
of such occurrence.
12 806 Ky. 25, 206 S.W.2d 83 (1947).
12a Id. at 32, 206 S.W.2d at 87.
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voluntarily assumed which is not at all unreasonable.13 Under a rule
which would convert assumption of risk into contributory negligence,
the plaintiff might be barred even though he was not in fact acting
in an unreasonable manner and had not voluntarily assumed the
particular risk which did result in injury to him.14
In the Richards case, assumption of risk was mentioned in con-
junction with contributory negligence. Porter' v. Cornett was cited in
this connection, but the statement in the Porter case to the effect
that the two doctrines are identical was not referred to. The court
merely lifted from the Porter case a statement that the 'legal effect"
of the two doctrines is the same. This refusal to accept the doctrines
as identical seems to indicate that future decisions will not be plagued
with the confusion that such an adoption can produce.
The principal case involved an inexperienced driver. Generally,
inexperience which leads to injury of another will not relieve a de-
fendant from the "reasonable man" test. But, in cases involving claims
by guest passengers various means have been adopted to reduce the
duty owed by the driver, or to cut off liability when the driver is
negligent. These well-known devices include assumption of risk,15
contributory negligence,' and guest statutes.'7
In jurisdictions which recognize assumption of risk as a defense
available to drivers in suits by injured guests, an important consid-
eration should be the standard of care to which the driver is held in
relation to guests. A question as to what the standard should be in
cases involving inexperienced drivers presents a problem which
must be solved. The Wisconsin courts recognize assumption of risk
as a defense in such cases, and a line of Wisconsin cases has applied
a clear-cut standard for determining the negligence issue. The driver
is held to a degree of care commensurate with his skill and experi-
13 For example when a spectator watches a baseball game knowing that
balls are thrown and hit with great force, he assumes the risk of being struck, and
yet this conduct may not be unreasonable. For cases involving this factual sit-
uation, see Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318
(1942); Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club Co., 62 Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E.2d
887 (1939); Annot. 142 A.L.R. 868 (1943).
14 For example, a spectator at a baseball game usually is held to assume the
risk of being struck by a ball. See note 13 sfupra. If a court held that he was thereby
contributorily negligent, it might carry the generalization too far and deny him
recovery when struck by a broken bat, when the latter risk had not in fact been
assumed.
15 Richards v. Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1959).
16 Sargent v. Williams, 258 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1953) where two young girls,
guests in an automobile driven by a fifteen year old boy whom they knew to be
unlicensed, were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
17 Carr v. Patram, 193 Va. 604, 70 S.E.2d 308 (1952). A driver who lost
control of his automobile after a blowout may not have exercised reasonable care,
but the evidence did not justify the submission of the issue of gross negligence
to the jury under a guest statute.
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ence, and the guest is held to assume the risks incident to the driver's
lack of experience or skill in driving of which he has knowledge.,,
This standard will hereafter be referred to as the Wisconsin rule.
The Kentucky court in the Richards case did not state the duty
owed by an inexperienced driver to his guest, and the writer has
been unable to find any Kentucky case in which this duty is expressly
stated. The logical assumption is, however, that the Wisconsin rule
is followed in Kentucky. The defendant in the Richards case was
certainly not subjected to the objective standard of ordinary care
which would have been required of an experienced driver. He was
obviously held to a degree of care commensurate with his skill and
experience, since the court found that no negligence existed, and
that the accident occurred solely as a result of the defendant's in-
experience.' 0
The Kentucky court should expressly adopt the Wisconsin rule,
and state the standard by which the negligence issue is determined in
cases involving inexperienced drivers and guests who know of this
inexperience. The Wisconsin rule does not seem unfair in that no
standard of care inconsistent with the knowledge and experience
of the driver is forced upon him. The affirmative adoption of a
standard by which such drivers are to be held would simplify the
adjudication of the issues of negligence and assumption of the risk.
An application of a workable standard for determining negli-
gence in such cases would place primary emphasis on the conduct
of the defendant, and would tend to reduce the use of substitutes
which courts may deem necessary in excusing the conduct of an
inexperienced driver. In the Richards case, for example, the court
inserted the "emergency" doctrine, saying:
It cannot be said this accident was caused by Edgar's negligence.
It was obviously caused by his inexperience in the proper handling
of the mechanical controls. An emergency was created when he
pushed down on the accelerator "too hard" and the automobile
"jumped across the road." He then panicked and failed to use the
means at his command to stop the car.
20
In applying the emergency doctrine in this manner, the court
undertook to separate the act of pressing down too hard on the
accelerator from the subsequent acts of the defendant. Actions taken
18 See Saxby v. Cadigan, 266 Wis. 391, 63 N.W.2d 820 (1954) where de-
fendant applied brakes and skidded on ice. In the absence of contrary proof, the
driver was presumed, as a matter of law, to have exercised the skill and judg-
ment which he possessed.
'9 The defendant is relieved of liability for injury resulting from his inex-
perience only when the plaintiff knew of this inexperience- otherwise, the require-
ment that plaintiff voluntarily assume the risk would not be met.
20 824 S.W.2d at 402.
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in emergencies are not measured by the conduct expected of one
acting under normal circumstances. 21 However, an emergency created
by the defendant's own negligence affords him no excuse for his
subsequent acts which cause injury to the plaintiff.22 Since the Ken-
tucky court concluded in the Richards case that the accident was one
which naturally follows from inexperience, it seems that it should
become unnecessary to determine whether or not the defendant
was confronted with an emergency. Also, the separation of the act
of pressing the accelerator from defendant's subsequent actions seems
to be a tenuous distinction. Such a distinction, used by the court to
indicate the existence of an emergency, can lead only to confusion as
to the precise grounds upon which the finding of an absence of negli-
gence was predicated.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the Richards case reaches a correct and sound
result. The Kentucky court seems to have recognized the distinction
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence and has
not followed the Porter case in declaring that the two doctrines are
identical. It seems, however, that the disposition of cases involving
inexperienced drivers and guests with knowledge of such inexperi-
ence would be greatly facilitated if the negligence question were
determined according to a particular standard of care. Under such a
test the problem would be viewed from a different perspective, in that
the conduct of the defendant would be the prime consideration. The
use of such a standard would, in many cases, render the determin-
ation of an assumption-of-risk question unnecessary and diminish
the use of confusing distinctions in order to lower the degree of care
required of an inexperienced driver.
Allen Prewitt, Jr.
Womr iN's COmPENSATioN-EMPLOYEE-INDEPENDENT CoNTRcroAR.
Claimant, while hauling coal from company's tipple to a railroad load-
ing ramp, was permanently injured when his truck overturned.
Claimant used his own truck, was paid by the ton, and paid operating
expenses of the truck. He worked only when the company's truck
could not handle all production; at that time the company's truck
2 1 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2, § 32, at 137; Pratt Fruit Co. v. Sparks Bros.
Bus Co., 313 Ky. 593, 233 S.W.2d 92 (1950).2 2 See, e.g., Craddock v. Torrence Oil Co., 322 Mich. 510, 34 N.W.2d 51
(1948).
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